Abstract-Cloud computing as a promising computing paradigm is increasingly utilized as potential hosts for users' massive dataset. Since the cloud service provider (CSP) is outside the users' trusted domain, existing research suggests encrypting sensitive data before outsourcing and adopting Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) to facilitate keyword-based searches over the ciphertexts. However, it remains a challenging task to design an effective SSE scheme that simultaneously supports sublinear search time, efficient update and verification, and on-demand information retrieval. To address this, we propose a Verifiable Dynamic Encryption with Ranked Search (VDERS) scheme that allows a user to perform top-K searches on a dynamic document collection and verify the correctness of the search results in a secure and efficient way. Specifically, we first provide a basic construction, VDERS 0 , where a ranked inverted index and a verifiable matrix are constructed to enable verifiable document insertion in top-K searches. Then, an advanced construction, VDERS ⋆ , is devised to further support document deletion with a reduced communication cost. Extensive experiments on real datasets demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our VDERS scheme.
INTRODUCTION
As a promising computing paradigm, cloud computing has drawn great attention from both research and industry communities. Because of the benefits of low costs, flexibility, and scalability, it has become a prevalent trend for users to outsource their massive datasets to clouds and delegate a cloud service provider (CSP) to manage data storage and offer query services. Due to security and privacy concerns, existing research suggests encrypting data before outsourcing [1] . However, data encryption makes keyword-based searches over ciphertexts a challenging problem. This is even harder for efficient top-K searches in a dynamic and malicious cloud environment [2] .
Let us consider the following scenario. Alice outsources archived emails to the cloud, where each email is indexed by the sender's name and ranked in descending order of the receipt date. For example, for a set of emails indexed by keyword Bob, the email received on April 2 has a higher rank than the email received on April 1. To keep keyword and document contents secret, Alice uploads them in the encrypted forms to the cloud. There could be hundreds of documents matching a specific keyword, and the consumed costs will be extensive if all the matched documents are returned to and decrypted by the user. Therefore, Alice may want to perform a top-K search to retrieve the most recent emails. Moreover, Alice may want to store only the emails received in the last three months for monetary saving. For example, when entering May, Alice will delete all emails received before February.
In the above application scenario, the adopted encryption scheme should meet the following requirements: (1) Ranked search. The user is allowed to perform a top-K search to retrieve the best-matched documents. (2) Dynamic. The user is able to update (add and delete) documents stored in the cloud. (3) Verifiability. The malicious CSP may delete encrypted documents not commonly used to save memory space, or it may forge the search results to deceive the user. Even if the CSP is honest, a virus or worm may tamper with encrypted documents. Therefore, the user should have the ability to verify the correctness of the search results. (4) Efficiency. The user can efficiently perform searches, updates, and verifications on a set of encrypted documents.
Although Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a user to retrieve desired documents in a privacy-preserving way, existing SSE schemes only partially address the above requirements. To simultaneously satisfy all these properties, this paper proposes a Verifiable Dynamic Encryption with Ranked Search (VDERS) scheme that allows the user to perform updates and top-K searches on ciphertexts in a verifiable and efficient way. Our main idea is to construct a verifiable matrix to record the ranking information and encode it with RSA accumulator [3] . Furthermore, a ranked inverted index is built from a collection of documents to facilitate efficient top-K searches and updates. Specifically, we first provide a basic construction, denoted by VDERS 0 , which enables verifiable document insertion operations. Then, we provide an advanced construction, denoted by VDERS ⋆ , which not only can support efficient deletion operations, but also can reduce communication costs without outsourcing the verifiable matrix. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a VDERS scheme to achieve dynamic and ranked searches in a cloud environment in an efficient and verifiable way.
• Two constructions are provided to achieve efficient top-K searches with support for verifiable updates.
• We theoretically analyze the security and performance of our scheme and conduct extensive experiments on real datasets to validate its effectiveness. Paper organization. We introduce related work in Section 2 and provide the preliminaries in Section 3. After the overview of this work in Section 4, we provide our basic and advanced VDERS constructions in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. We evaluate the proposed scheme in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
Our work focuses on verifiable ranked queries on dynamic encrypted data. SSE that allows an untrusted server to perform keyword-based searches on ciphertexts can partially address our requirements.
SSE has been widely researched since it was first proposed by Song et al. [4] . As a seminal work in SSE, Curtmola et al. [5] provided a rigorous security definition and constructed two schemes, SSE-1 and SSE-2, based on an inverted index. Compared to SSE-1, SSE-2 is more secure, and it has been proven to be secure against adaptive chosen keyword attacks (CKA2). SSE-1 is secure against nonadaptive chosen-keyword attacks (CKA1), but yields an optimal (sublinear) search time O(r), where r is the number of documents that contain the query keyword. However, neither SSE-1 nor SSE-2 has properties of dynamism, verifiability, and ranked search.
Dynamic SSE (DSSE) allows a user to update the encrypted outsourced data in an efficient and secure way. Kamara et al. [6] constructed a DSSE scheme based on an extended inverted index. Their subsequent work [7] extended it to a parallel search setting by using a red-black tree. Cash et al. [8] constructed a DSSE scheme optimized for superlarge datasets, but their scheme supports only efficient document insertion. Naveed et al. [9] put forward a DSSE scheme in which a server worked as a blind storage to decrease leakage at the cost of multiple rounds of interaction. The above schemes are proven to be CKA2-secure, but leak keyword information about the newly added documents. With this leakage, the attackers can reveal the content of a past query by injecting new documents in a dataset [10] . To mitigate such an attack, Stefanov et al. [11] proposed the first DSSE scheme with forward privacy, but their scheme suffers from inefficiency. Since then, forward privacy has been the main motivation of recent DSSE schemes [12] , [13] .
Verifiable SSE (VSSE) allows a user to verify the correctness of search results. Kurosawa et al. [14] constructed a Universally Composable (UC)-secure VSSE scheme, in which a user can detect any malicious server's cheating behavior. While UC-security is stronger than CKA2-security, their construction requires a linear search time. Soleimanian et al. [15] presented a public VSSE scheme, which delegates a third party to accomplish the verification, but fails to support dynamic operations. The subsequent work of Kurosawa et.al [16] extends VSSE to a dynamic environment. Their scheme employs RSA accumulator [3] to generate constantsize digests/proofs, but the verification cost on the client side grows linearly with the total number of documents. To enable verifiable conjunctive keyword search over dynamic encrypted data, Sun et al. [17] exploited the bilinear-map accumulator technique to construct an accumulation tree. Jiang et al. [18] proposed a VDSSE scheme that also utilized an accumulator tree to verify results of boolean queries. The accumulator tree structure is more efficient than RSA accumulator in verification, but consumes more computation time for updating tree structure. Zhu et al. [19] proposed a generic VSSE scheme in a multi-user setting, where the verifiable design can provide result verification for any SSE schemes and support data updates. However, the above VSSE schemes return all search results and therefore, may be unsuitable for an environment where a lot of documents match a user's query but the user is only interested in best-match documents.
Ranked SSE (RSSE) allows a user to rank the search results based on different evaluation functions. Cao et al. [20] proposed a dynamic multi-keyword RSSE scheme which utilized the secure KNN technique [21] to rank results according to the number of matched query keywords. The main limitation of their scheme is inefficiency, where the search time increases linearly with the number of documents. Inspired by their work, many multi-keyword VRSSE schemes [22] - [26] were put forward. Sun et al. [22] proposed a verifiable RSSE scheme which ranked search results based on cosine similarity while improving search efficiency by an MDB tree structure. Chen et al. [23] proposed a RSSE scheme based on a hierarchical clustering index. Their scheme supports update and verification, but requires the client to re-encrypt search indexes once a document is added into a dataset. Zhang et al. [24] developed a RSSE scheme in a multi-owner model, where the search time grew linearly with the number of queried keywords. Fu et al. [25] leveraged a user interest model to assign weight to query keywords according to the user's search history. Guo et al. [26] put forward a dynamic multi-phrase SSE scheme that allowed the user to rank results locally based on TF-IDF scores. However, it is hard for existing RSSE schemes to simultaneously support sublinear search time and efficient updates and verification. The comparison results between our work and previous SSE schemes are shown in Table 1 .
PRELIMINARY

System Model
The system consists of three different parties: the CSP, the data owner, and the data user, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The CSP maintains cloud platforms that pool hard and soft resources to provide data storage and query services.
The data owner first creates ciphertexts c for a document collection d. Given keywords w extracted from d, she then builds a secure index I for fast searches, and generates a local evidence Ψ and remote auxiliary information Φ for verifiable searches. After uploading (c, I, Φ) to the cloud, she can perform updates on ciphertexts with an update token T * and retrieve documents on demand with a search token T W in a verifiable way. On receiving the search results and a search proof (R W , Π) from the CSP, the data owner recovers document contents after verifying the correctness of the search results. The data owner can also delegate the search/update/verification ability to authorized data users. In this paper, we do not differentiate between the data owner and the data user, and refer to them as users.
Adversary Model
We assume that the users are fully trusted. The CSP is the potential attacker and is assumed to be honest but curious [1] . That is, the CSP would correctly execute the prespecified protocol, but still attempt to learn extra information about the stored data and the received message.
As defined in [5] , access pattern refers to the outcome of search results, i.e., which documents have been returned; search pattern refers to whether two searches have been performed for the same keyword. As a tradeoff between security and efficiency, existing SSE schemes resort to the weakened security guarantee for efficiency concerns. That is, they will reveal the access pattern and the search pattern but nothing else during the search process. Like existing SSE schemes, such information is also available to the CSP in our scheme. Furthermore, in a top-K search, only K highest ranked documents will be returned. Therefore, our scheme will leak information about document ranks besides access pattern and search pattern. It is worth noticing that the leakage of ranking information is inevitable in top-K searches. For example, the adversary first issues a top-1 search and then a top-2 search for keyword W , thereby it can know that the document returned in the first round has the highest rank and the new document returned in the second round is ranked second. If the adversary issues top-1, 2, . . . , top-K continuously, then the rank of each document will be exposed by comparing search results.
Our scheme mainly aims to preserve the following privacy properties:
• Confidentiality. The CSP knows nothing about the document/keyword contents expect search pattern, access pattern, and document ranks.
• Verifiability. The CSP cannot forge a search result or falsify the outsourced ciphertexts.
RSA accumulator
RSA accumulator [3] is applied to verify the correctness of the search results in our scheme. It provides a constant-size digest for an arbitrarily large set of inputs and a constantsize witness for any element in the set such that it can be used to verify the (non-)membership of the element in this set. Let κ ∈ N be a security parameter, and let p = 2p ′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1 be two large primes where p ′ , q ′ are primes such that |pq| > 3κ. Let F = {f : {0, 1} 3κ → {0, 1} κ } be a family of two-universal hash functions, let N = pq and φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1), and let G be a cyclic group of size (p − 1)(q − 1)/4 where g is a generator of G. For a set of elements E = {y 1 , . . . , y n } with y i ∈ {0, 1} κ , the RSA accumulator works as follows:
• For each y i ∈ E, we choose a random prime
mod N is produced.
• The subset test is carried out by checking Acc(E) = π
κ , we can compute a prime x ∈ {0, 1} 3κ such that f (x) = y with overwhelming probability from the set of inverses
Strong RSA assumption. [30] Given N = pq and a random element y ∈ Z N , it is hard to find x and e > 1 such that y = x e mod N. Proposition 2. Given N, g, f , and E = {y 1 , . . . , y n }, it is hard to find y ̸ ∈ E and π such that π P(y) = Acc(E) mod N under the strong RSA assumption.
Given Proposition 1, a prime x i can be computed efficiently for any y i ∈ E. The security of RSA accumulator is based on strong RSA assumption and Proposition 2.
SCHEME OVERVIEW
Notations
Let κ ∈ N be a secure parameter of the whole system, and let 0 be a string of 0s with length κ. . We assume that the identifier associated with each document/keyword is independent of its contents, and thus is allowed to be exposed to the CSP. Let ξ be a function outputting the identifier of a document or Table 2 .
Ranked Inverted Index
In the inverted index [5] , a list of nodes pointing to documents containing keyword W ∈ w are randomly stored in a search array A s and the pointer to the head node is stored in a search [6] , we set #T s = m + 1, where the first m entries correspond to keywords in w and the last entry points to an unused entry in A s ; and we set #A s = ||c||/8 + z to protect statistical information about d, where ||c|| is the bit length of the ciphertext collection and z ∈ N is the number of unused entries in A s . 2. The role of scores is to order documents in top-K searches. Therefore, there is no need to use authentic scores for comparison, and all scores will be preprocessed by order preserving functions like [27] , [28] .
Verifiable Matrix
κ be a pseudo-random function (PRF) with key k 4 . The verifiable matrix V is an m × n matrix defined as follows: 
Scheme Definition
The VDERS scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• (params, SK) ← GenKey(1 κ ): It takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs public parameters params and a secret key SK.
• (I, c) ← Encryption(SK, d, w): It takes a secret key SK, a sequence of documents d, and a sequence of keywords w as inputs, and outputs a ranked inverted index I and a sequence of ciphertexts c.
• (Φ, Ψ) ← AccGen(params, SK, d, w, c): It takes public parameters params, a secret key SK, a sequence of documents d, a sequence of keywords w, and a sequence of ciphertexts c as inputs. It outputs remote auxiliary information Φ and a local evidence Ψ.
• T W ← SrcToken(SK, W ): It takes a secret key SK and a keyword W ∈ w as inputs to generate a search token T W .
• R W ← Search(I, T W ): It takes a search token T W and an index I as inputs to output search results R W .
• Π ← GenProof(params, c, Φ, T W , R W ): It takes public parameters params, a sequence of ciphertexts c, remote auxiliary information Φ, a search token T W , and search results R W as inputs to generate a search proof Π.
• {0, 1} ← Verify(params, SK, Ψ, T W , R W , Π): It takes public parameters params, a secret key SK, a local evidence Ψ, a search token T W , search results R W , and a search proof Π as inputs. It outputs 1 if verification is successful, and outputs 0 otherwise. If the output is 1, for each ciphertext in R W , it takes a secret key SK as input to recover plaintext.
•
It takes public parameters params, a secret key SK, a document D, and a local evidence Ψ as inputs to generate an update token T * and a new local evidence Ψ ′ , where * ∈ {add, del}.
It takes a ranked inverted index I, a ciphertext collection c, remote auxiliary information Φ, and an update token T * as inputs. It generates a new ranked inverted index I ′ , a new ciphertext collection c ′ , and new remote auxiliary information Φ ′ .
Definition 2 (Correctness of VDERS). VDERS is correct if for
all κ ∈ N, for all keys generated by the GenKey algorithm, for all (I, c) output by the Encryption algorithm, and for all updates, the Search algorithm always returns the correct search results.
Security Definition
Confidentiality. We follow the approach in [6] that utilizes leakage functions to capture what is being revealed by ciphertexts and tokens. Let Adv be a stateful adversary, let Sim be a stateful simulator, and let
, and L 4 (d, D) be stateful leakage algorithms. We consider the following probabilistic experiments.
• Real Adv (κ): the challenger runs GenKey(1 κ ) to generate a secret key SK. Adv outputs d and receives (I, c) from the challenger so that (I, c) ← Encryption(SK, d, w). Adv makes a polynomial number of adaptive queries, and for each query, it receives from the challenger either a search to-
. Finally, Adv returns a bit b that is output by the experiment.
• Ideal Adv,Sim (κ): Adv outputs d. Given L 1 (d), Sim generates and sends a pair (I, c) to Adv. Adv makes a polynomial number of adaptive queries. Given either
, Sim returns an appropriate token and in the case of an add operation, a ciphtertext C. Finally, Adv returns a bit b that is output by the experiment.
Definition 3 (Confidentiality of VDERS). VDERS is confidential if for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries Adv, there exists a PPT simulator
Intrinsically, the confidentiality of VDERS is equivalent to the CKA2 security of [6] , in which Adv's views given by Sim are indistinguishable from those in the real world.
Verifiability. It describes the fact that no adversary can deceive the user to accept incorrect search results. As in [16] , we say that the adversary Adv wins if given (d, w, I) and search queries Adv can return (R W , Π) for some query such that R W ̸ = R W and the user accepts the result. (d, w, I ) and any query.
Definition 4 (Verifiability of VDERS). VDERS is verifiable if for any PPT adversary Adv, Pr(Adv wins) is negligible for any
BASIC VDERS SCHEME
Main Idea
The foundational technologies in our VDERS scheme are RSA accumulator (defined in Section 3.3), the ranked inverted index (defined in Section 4.2), and the verifiable matrix (defined in Section 4.3). Our main idea is first building a ranked inverted index to achieve sublinear search time in top-K queries, and then verifying the correctness of search results based on RSA accumulator and the verifiable matrix.
Specially, the search index is constructed as a ranked inverted index. Unlike the inverted index [5] in which each node contains only information about document identifier and the location of the next node in the search array, our ranked inverted index incorporates ranking information in each node to enable top-K queries in cloud computing.
Furthermore, inspired by the work in [16] , our VDERS scheme also employs RSA accumulator for dynamic verification. The main difference from their work is that our scheme constructs a verifiable matrix V to record the document ranking information for each keyword, and calculates the remote auxiliary information Φ and a local evidence Ψ by encoding the elements of V into RSA accumulator.
Our Construction
Let F = {f : {0, 1} 3κ → {0, 1} κ } be a family of twouniversal hash functions and let SKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a symmetric-key encryption (SKE) scheme, where Gen is a key generation algorithm, Enc is an encryption algorithm, 
Choose a κ-bit random string r i and set
Encrypt the address of the head node N 1 and set
Create a free list L free = (F 1 , . . . , F z ) (N, g, f ) and the secret key as
• (I, c) ← Encyption(SK, d, w): Assume that −1 denotes a (log #A s + 1)-length string of 1s and that free denotes a word not in w. The user runs Alg. 1 to build a ranked inverted index I = (T s , A s ) and a sequence of ciphertexts c = (C 1 , . . . , C n ) .
In Alg. 1, the user first builds a ranked inverted index I as follows: After initializing the search table T s and the search array A s (Line 1), for each keyword W ∈ w, she creates an encrypted list L W of nodes storing at random locations of A s , and stores the encrypted address of the head node in T s (Lines 2-6). Then, she creates an unencrypted free list L free by choosing z unused entries at random in A s and stores the address of the tail node in T s (Lines 7-10). Next, she fills 3. A prime x is chosen randomly from f −1 . A secret key ka ∈ {0, 1} κ shared between the user and the CSP is used as the randomness when computing x, so that they obtain the same outputs from f −1 . 
Algorithm 2 VDERS
the remaining entries of A s with random strings to hind statistical information about the document collection (Lines 11-12). Finally, she generates a sequence of ciphertexts c and returns (I, c) as the outputs of Alg. 1 (Lines 13-15).
• (Φ, Ψ) ← AccGen(params, SK, d, w, c): The user constructs a verifiable matrix V as defined in Section 4.3, and sets the remote auxiliary information as Φ = V. Let P(y) be a random prime x such that f (x) = y. She calculates a local evidence Ψ = (ψ C , ψ I ) with Eq. 2 and Eq. 3.
• T W ← SrcToken(SK, W ): To retrieve the top-K documents, the user generates a search token
If the user wants to retrieve all documents containing keyword W , K in T W is replaced by notation * .
• (Lines 1-3) . Otherwise, the CSP first recovers the address of head node of L W in A s and recovers all nodes of L W in sequence (Lines 4-8). Then, it sorts documents according to their scores and returns identifiers, scores, and ciphertexts of the matched documents as the search results R W (Lines 9-17).
• Π ← GenProof(params, c, Φ, T W , R W ): For top-K queries, the CSP parses T W as (τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , τ 4 , τ 5 ), and sets search proof Π = (π C , π I ) with Eq. 4 and Eq. 5.
where
(H(i, V[i][j])).
For normal queries, parameter K in both Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 is replaced by |d W |.
• {0, 1} ← Verify(params, SK, Ψ, T W , R W , Π): Let ID j be the identifier of the rank-j document containing keyword W . To verify a top-K query, for i ∈ [K], the user computes x i with Eq. 6 and checks whether Eq. 7 holds. 
If Eq. 7 and Eq. 9 hold, she outputs 1, and 0 otherwise. For normal queries, parameter K in both Eq. 7 and Eq. 9 is replaced by |d W |. If the output is 1, for each ciphertext C j ∈ R W , the user runs SKE.Dec to recover document D j .
• 
P(H(j,H(C ′ )))
P(H(j,H(C
To add document D with ξ(D) = n + 1, the user sets the update token as T * = T add = ((n + 1, add, C n+1 ), ζ, τ v , τ a ), where C n+1 is the output of SKE.Enc(k e , D n+1 ), ζ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ m ) are a sequence of κ-bit random strings, τ v = (β 1 , . . . , β |wn+1| ) and τ a = (λ 1 , . . . , λ |wn+1| ). For the i-th keyword W ∈ w n+1 , she computes β i and λ i as follows: 1) She computes the scores ε i of document D n+1 , chooses a random string r i of κ bits, and computes λ i = (λ i [1] , λ i [2] , λ i [3] , λ i [4] , λ i [5] ) as:
2) She first performs a normal query to retrieve all documents containing keyword W and verifies the correctness of the search results R W . Then, she determines the rank of D n+1 , denoted by J, by comparing its score, ε i , with those of documents in R W , and sets β i = (β i [1] , β i [2] , β i [3] , β i [4] , β i [5] , β i [6] ) as:
Algorithm 3 VDERS 0 .Update
Input:
The original ranked inverted index I, the original ciphertexts c, the original remote auxiliary information Φ, and the update token T * OutPut: The updated versions of ranked inverted index, ciphertexts, and remote auxiliary information
Mark C j as delete and replace C j ∈ c ′ with C ′ 4: else 5 :
for the i-the keyword W ∈ w n+1 do 8: Compute ϖ ← T s [free] and obtain the last free location ϖ in A s Recover the address of the first node
Store a new node at location ϖ as the first node of
Store the pointer to the first node of
14:
Add ζ as the last column of V ′
15:
for the i-th keyword W ∈ w n+1 do 16: Set J = β i [6] and τ = λ i [5] 17:
if J < n then 18: for j = n to J + 1 do
20:
else 23 :
25: [2] , and
where ID j is the identifier of the rank-j document for keyword W before update, and ID |dW |+1 = ID 0 = 0. In the special case, if J = 1, we set
For i ∈ [|w n+1 |], she computes y i with Eq. 14:
Note that if β i [j] = ⊥, P(H(λ i [5] , β i [j])) will be set to 1. Then, she updates ψ I to ψ ′ I with Eq. 15:
where χ = [m]/{λ 1 [5] , . . . , λ |wn+1| [5] } is a set of elements and γ i ∈ ζ is a κ-bit random string.
The CSP runs algorithm Alg. 3 to generate the updated versions of ranked 
Illustration Example
The correctness of our VDERS scheme can be sketched in the following example.
(Initial phase) Given a sequence of documents d = (D 1 , D 2 , D 3 , D 4 ) and a sequence of keywords w = (W 1 , W 2 , W 3 ), document ranks for each keyword are shown in Fig 3-(a) . Given (params, SK), the user encrypts each document D i ∈ d with SKE to generate ciphertext collection c = (C 1 , . . . , C 4 ), and constructs the verifiable matrix V and the ranked inverted index I as shown in Fig. 4-(a) and Fig. 2-(a) , respectively.
She then sets the remote auxiliary information as Φ = V and calculates the local evidence Ψ = (ψ C , ψ I ) as:
Finally, she sends (params, I, c, Φ) to the CSP, and keeps (SK, Ψ) locally.
(Search phase) To retrieve the top-1 document containing keyword W 2 , the user sends the search token
The CSP locates T s [F k1 (W 2 )] = T s [3] and recovers the address of the first node in A s by computing 4 = T s [3] ⊕ G k2 (W 2 ). It then computes A s [4] ⊕ H(P k3 (W 2 ), r 1 ) to recover the first node N 1 = ⟨4, 120, 3⟩, where 4 is the identifier of the first document, 120 is the score, and 3 is the address of the next node in A s . In the same way, it recovers the second node N 2 = ⟨3, 110, −1⟩, where 3 is the identifier of the second document, 110 is file score, and −1 indicates D 3 is the last document containing keyword W 2 . The CSP sorts documents according to their scores, and sets the search results as 3), (120, 110) , C 4 ). Next, it calculates the search proof Π = (π C , π I ) as:
(H(i, V[i][j])).
The messages returned to the user are set as (R W , Π).
Once the user receives the messages returned, she computes x = P(H(4, H(C 4 ))) and checks if ψ C = π 
,3 P(H(i,H(Ci)))·P(H(4,H(C4)))
= g
P(H(i,V[i][j]))·P(H(3,V[3][1]))· ∏ j=2,3,4 P(H(3,V[3][j]))
P(H(i,V[i][j]))
= ψ I If all these checks succeed, she can recover document D 2 from ciphertext C 2 ∈ R W .
(Update phase) As shown in Fig. 3-(b) , document D 5 , the rank-2 document for keyword W 2 , is added. The user generates the update token T * = T add = ((5, add, C 5 ), ζ, τ v , τ a ) as follows: she first generates the ciphertext C 5 of document D 5 with SKE, and sets ζ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ), where γ i is a random string of κ bits. Then, she sets τ v = β where
, and β[6] = 2. Furthermore, she chooses a random string r 3 of κ bits and sets [3] ), and λ [5] = σ(2) = 3.
Next, she computes y as:
Finally, she generates the new local evidence H(C5) )) mod N, and ψ (H(1,γ1) )·P (H(2,γ2) )·y I mod N. Given T * , the CSP generates the updated verifiable matrix V ′ and the updated ranked inverted indexes I ′ as shown in Fig. 4-(b) and Fig. 2-(b) , respectively. We leave the construction of document deletion to the readers.
Security Proof
We first provide the definitions of the leakage functions. The definitions below closely follow those in [6] except that rank information of each document is also exposed.
#A s is the size of search array, ξ is the identifier function outputting the identifier of a document D or keyword W , and ||D|| is the bit length of document D.
is the access pattern defined as the sequence of document identifiers id W = (ID 1 , . . . , ID |dW | ) where ID j is the identifier of the rank-j document for keyword W .
where apprs(W ) is a bit set to 1 if W appears in at least one document in d and to 0 otherwise.
• A proof is given in the appendix.
6 ADVANCED VDERS SCHEME
Main Idea
Our basic VDERS construction allows top-K queries in a dynamic and verifiable way, but falls short in the following aspects: (1) Inefficiency in deletion operation. It flags the deleted document but keeps corresponding nodes in the search array A s . Therefore, it has no real meaning to delete a document and limits the number of the documents that can be added. (2) Inefficiency in verification. It requires to transmit the verifiable matrix V to the CSP for the generation of search proofs. The complexity of V is O(nmκ), which may be unacceptable for a large-scale dataset.
To release the space of a deleted document, we define a deletion table T j for each document D j ∈ d as follows: To delete document D j with ξ(D) = j, the user first retrieves (C j , T j ) from the CSP, and recovers T j . Then, she sets the update token as T * = T del = ((j, delete), τ v , τ a ), where  τ v = (ν 1 , . . . , ν |wj | ) and τ a = (λ 1 . . . , λ |wj | ) . For the i-th keyword W ∈ w j , she computes ν i and λ i as follows:
1) She performs normal queries to retrieve all documents containing keyword W . For node N ∈ L W that corresponds to document D j , the CSP will return (addr s (N −1 ), addr s (N +1 ) 
2) After verifying the correctness of R
with Eq. 1, and calculates ϕ λi [5] 
Then, she determines the rank of D j , denoted by J, and sets
, where x i is calculated as follows: [5] 
Then, she calculates x i with Eq. 23 and sets ν i = ϕ λi [5] × x i mod φ(N):
Security Proof
We assume that the size of deletion table T j is the same as that of document D j . Therefore, VDERS ⋆ has the same leakages as VDERS 0 except that more information is leaked in the deletion operation. We provide the definition for
is the information leaked by the deletion token. 
EVALUATION
Performance Analysis
We compare the performance of VDERS 0 , VDERS ⋆ , and the two schemes proposed in [16] and [6] (denoted by BASELINE1 and BASELINE2, respectively) in terms of computational and communication complexities. For computation cost, we only consider the most expensive operations, i.e., the calculation of RSA accumulators, and we analyze the incurred cost from the server side and the user side, respectively. Note that BASELINE2 is not verifiable, and thus, its cost is 0; it will not be listed. Given a collection of n documents with m keywords, the comparison results are shown in Table 3 , where K is the parameter for a top-K search, |d W | is the number of documents containing keyword W , and |w j | is the total number of keywords contained in document D j . For communication cost, all schemes encrypt documents with SKE, and the sizes of the ciphertexts are the same. Furthermore, RSA accumulator generates a constant-size search proof. Therefore, we only consider the sizes of a secure index, a verifiable matrix, and a search/update token. The comparison results are shown in Table 4 , where Ξ = ∑ |d W | is the total number of keyword-document pairs. 
Parameter Setting
Experiments were conducted on a local machine running the Microsoft Windows 10 Ultimate operating system with an Inter Core i5 CPU running at 3.4GHz and 8GB memory. . Given fixed K = 20, the time of (a) changes over the number of documents n; Given fixed n = 30, 000, the time of (b) changes over parameter K. The programs were implemented in Java and compiled using Eclipse 4.6.0. The cryptographic algorithms were implemented with JPBC library. To validate the effectiveness and efficiency of the VDERS scheme in practice, we conducted a performance evaluation on a real e-mail data set, the Enron Email Data Set 5 . This data set has 30,000 plaintext e-mails with a total size of about 71.2MB. The average size of each document is 2.43KB. We chose 1 ∼ 3 keywords for each document after ranking them by frequency of occurrence, and got 7,922 keywords finally.
Experiment Results
We compared our VDERS constructions with BASELINE1 and BASELINE2 in terms of the communication cost and the execution time in the initial phase, search phase, and update phase. Since BASELINE2 is unverifiable, it lacks algorithms AccGen, GenProof, and Verify. Furthermore, SKE is employed to encrypt document contents in all schemes, and the computation and communication costs of generating 5 . http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼./enron/ a search token are very small. Therefore, we left out the time of encrypting documents in algorithm Encrption, and omitted the comparison of algorithm SrcToken. need to transmit auxiliary information to the CSP. Furthermore, the communication cost of VDERS ⋆ in the AccGen algorithm is also largely reduced since it only needs to transmit m integers to the CSP. Fig. 6 shows the execution time at the server side in the search phase. In Fig. 6-(a) , as the number of documents n grows, BASELINE1 needs to decrypt longer strings and return more documents, rendering the execution time to grow linearly; The search time in our VDERS constructions and BASELINE2 is impacted by the number of documents matching a keyword, and thus increases smoothly. In Fig. 6-(b) , the execution time of algorithm GenProof in both VDERS 0 and BASELINE is mainly impacted by the number of documents n. However, in our advanced GenProof algorithm, the computation of Eq. 17 is based on Φ ⋆ , and the execution time increases slightly as n increases. For example, the execution time in VDERS 0 and VDERS ⋆ increases from 68s to 582s, and from 4s to 18s, respectively, as n increases from 5,000 to 30,000. From Fig. 6 -(c)(d), we know that the execution time of algorithm Search is slightly impacted by parameter K, but the execution time of algorithm GenProof decreases smoothly as K increases. For example, as K increases from 10 to 50, the execution time of algorithm Search in VDERS 0 fluctuates around 0.08ms, and the execution time of algorithm GenProof in VDERS ⋆ decreases from 20s to 12s. Fig. 7 shows the execution time at the user side in the search phase. From this figure, we know that our VDER-S constructions have better performance compared with BASELINE1. To verify the search results, the number of RSA accumulator calculations in BASELINE1, VDERS 0 , and VDERS ⋆ is mainly impacted by |d W | + n, K, and |d W | + K, respectively. Therefore, the execution time of BASELINE1 in Fig. 7 -(a) grows linearly as n increases, but it remains unchanged in Fig. 7-(b) as K increases. On the contrary, the execution time of VDERS ⋆ in Fig. 7 -(a) changes slightly and VDERS 0 just fluctuates around a fixed value as n increases, but they both grow linearly in Fig. 7-(b) as K increases. Fig. 8 shows the communication costs in the update phase. In terms of adding a document, VDERS 0 incurs the largest communication cost because it needs to upload m extra random numbers to the CSP. BASELINE1 incurs the minimal cost because it only needs to upload m bits. From Fig. 8-(a) , we know that the cost of BASELINE2 grows linearly, the costs of our VDERS constructions grow slightly, but the cost of BASELINE1 remains unchanged, as |w j | increases. For example, as |w j | increases from 10 to 40, the cost of BASELINE1 remains as 8KB, but the costs of BASELINE2, VDERS 0 , and VDERS ⋆ , increase from 43KB to 170KB, from 259KB to 269KB, and from 6KB to 12KB, respectively. In terms of deleting a document, the communication costs of BASELINE1 and VDERS ⋆ are negligibly small, and we only consider VDERS ⋆ and BASELINE2. From Fig. 8 -(b), we know that the cost of BASELINE2 is independent of |w j |, but the cost of VDERS ⋆ badly grows with |w j |. Fig. 9 shows the computation time in the update phase. In Fig. 9-(a) , BASELINE1 needs to compute m times of RSA accumulators, and thus it incurs the maximum execution time. In Fig. 9-(b) , VDERS 0 incurs the maximum execution time since it needs to update both the ranked inverted index and the verifiable matrix. In terms of deleting a document, we still only consider VDERS ⋆ and BASELINE2. In Fig. 9 -(c), the time of BASELINE2 is independent of |w j |, but the time of VDERS ⋆ grows with |w j |. In Fig. 9-(d) , both the time of VDERS ⋆ and BASELINE2 grows as |w j | increases. Furthermore, BASELINE2 with a more complicated index structure incurs more execution time than VDERS ⋆ .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a VDERS scheme to simultaneously support sublinear search time, efficient update and verification, and on-demand information retrieval in cloud computing environment. Experiment results demonstrate that our scheme is effective for verifying the correctness of top-K searches on a dynamic document collection. As part of our future work, we will try to design a forward secure VDERS scheme, where the update phase does not leak keyword information about a newly added document.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The confidentiality proof of VDERS ⋆ is similar to that of VDERS 0 . The main differences from VDERS 0 are marked as the boxed code in VDERS ⋆ .
Proof: We describe a PPT simulator Sim such that for all PPT adversaries Adv, the outputs of Real Adv (κ) and Ideal Adv,Sim (κ) are computationally indistinguishable. Consider Sim that adaptively simulates an encrypted index I = (A s , T s ), a set of ciphertexts c, and t ∈ N tokens T 1 , . . . , T t as follows:
(Setting up internal data structures) Given 
